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THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
SHOULD NOT APPLY
TO ADMINSTRATIVE HEARINGS
D. J. Agatstein
[The following argument was
presented to the 1986 Annual
Meeting of the NAALJ, and is
reprinted here at the direction
of the President of the
Association. The usually high
editorial standards of the
Journal have been waived in
order to permit its inclusion.
The author wishes to thank
Honorable Paul Wyler for much
of the material used in this
presentation.]
May it please the Court!
I stand before you today as advocate for the
position that collateral estoppel should not apply to
administrative hearings. I take this position at the
request of our esteemed President, Judge Margaret Giovaniello.
Whether I am, in fact, devil's advocate in this matter is
very much open to speculation.
When I speak of collateral estoppel, I am in fact
talking about two separate doctrines. The first is fact
preclusion, by which I mean this:
When an issue of fact is necessarily decided by
one adjudicative tribunal, a party to that proceeding is
precluded from urging any other tribunal to make any different
factual findings. Stated somewhat differently, the facts
necessarily found by one tribunal are binding upon the
parties when the same issues of fact arise before another
tribunal.
By issue preclusion, I refer to mixed questions of
law and fact. For example, the question of whether a person
was fired for misconduct, or acted in good faith, or had
good or just or probable cause for his actions combine a
general legal standard with the circumstances of a particular
case. When such an issue is decided by one tribunal, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel would preclude any other
tribunal from making any inconsistent determination.
There are, of course, other definitions. One is
given by Prof. Hank Perritt in a publication close to my
heart, the Journal of the National Association of Adminis-
trative Law Judges. _/
Before launching into my argument, I would make a
few further observations.
First is that collateral estoppel is usually
distinguished from res judicata. Res judicata is generally
defined as precluding the same parties from relitigating the
identical claim. Simply stated, you can't sue the same
person twice on the same cause of action.
Secondly, collateral estoppel can apply to any
combination of tribunals--administrative, arbitration, civil
and criminal. The rules vary in each case.
Third, with respect to collateral estoppel, there
may be different considerations if the first tribunal finds
a fact, or fails to find a fact, or finds that an alleged
fact has not been proven.
Next, there may be a difference if the first
tribunal actually resolves an issue, or merely could have
resolved the issue.
It is sometimes said that res judicata applies to
all claims that were or might have been litigated before the
first tribunal, whereas collateral estoppel only applies to
claims that were actually litigated. Z/
1/ Perritt, Preclusive Effect of Administrative Decisions
in Wrongful Dismissal Suits. 5 J.N.A.A.L.J. 33 (Spring
1985).
/ Raff, Collateral Estoppel and Unemployment Insurance
Decisions, March 7, 1986 (unpublished). Rovin, The
Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative Law Decisions27
Finally, there may be a distinction based upon
whether a hearing was actually conducted, or whether there
was merely the opportunity for a hearing. In other words,
there is some dispute over the collateral effect of default
judgments. P/
However, our present discussion is limited to the
common situation in which an administrative hearing is
conducted first, and thereafter, the same facts or issues
arise in litigation before a civil court.
I will be speaking principally, but not exclusively,
about benefit cases.
I contend that collateral estoppel should not
apply.in such cases.
I will attempt to prove that application of the
doctrine to administrative hearings will not serve the best
interests of the parties or the public. I will show that
the doctrine conflicts with basic principles of our consti-
tutional system of fairness and justice. Finally, and
perhaps incidentally, I will show that abolition of the
doctrine will enhance the prestige and legitimate power of
Administrative Law Judges, make their jobs easier, and
enable them to better fulfill their judicial function.
It is axiomatic that administrative tribunals
should provide parties With a prompt hearing in which the
litigants' substantive rights may be determined quickly.
The panoply of procedural remedies and evidentiary rules
which protect litigants in the courts of common law are
intentionally omitted from administrative trials. Speed and
simplicity are the hallmarks, perhaps the raison d'etre, of
administrative proceedings.
Let us look at the element of speed. It would be
fatuous to espouse any system which did not give paramount
importance to the immediate determination of welfare claims,
unemployment claims, social security claims, workers
in Subsequent Court Actions, IV Labor & Employment Law News,
No. 3, p. 11 (1985); see also, People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d
468 (1982).
3/ See, e.g.
,
Re Garland 401 F. Supp. 608, 610 (1975).
compensation claims, license revocation cases, parole
hearings, and similar matters. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has mandated promptness in many of these cases. 4/
However, there is a price for speedy adjudication.
By definition, parties do not have a great deal of time to
investigate their cases, to interview witnesses, to gather
evidence or to prepare for a hearing. In the interests of
speed, parties are generally denied the right, available to
litigants in the civil court, to engage in pre-trial discovery,
to obtain bills of particulars, to request interrogatories,
and to take the pre-trial oral depositions of opposing
parties. 5/ Even the right to subpoena witnesses, which
exists in most administrative agencies, is rendered illusory
by the absence of the contempt power necessary to enforce
the subpoenas. As a result, parties are generally not well
prepared to present all of the facts to an administrative
tribunal.
Secondly, the parties to an administrative hearing
often do not have the resources to present a proper case.
How realistic is it to suggest that a poor person, or an
unemployed person, or a disabled person, can properly
investigate and present a case? Most do not even have
lawyers (fewer than 2% of Unemployment Insurance claimants
have attorneys, according to one study). 6/ Indeed, the
administrative system is designed to permit parties to try
their cases without the very substantial cost of legal
counsel.
By contrast, in civil litigation, particularly
tort cases, an attorney may represent the party on a contin-
gency fee basis. In contingency cases, the attorney advances
the cost of investigation and discovery, defers his fee
until the outcome of the case, and receives no fee unless he
4/ E.., California Dep't. of Human Resources Development
v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
5_/ See Sherwood, Evolution of Administrative Collateral
Estoppel, California Lawyer, June 1986, p. 33.
6_/ Report by the New York State Assembly Standing
Committee on Labor (Frank J. Barbaro, Chairman) "Due Process
in the Unemployment Insurance System in New York State",
1981 (hereinafter, "Barbaro Report").
is successful. In administrative benefit cases, the size of
the attorney's fee, and his resulting availability to
represent his client, are limited, either by statute, as in
New York, 7/ or by practical consideration of the amount in
issue.
Indeed, the amount in issue is a separate factor
which limits the scope of administrative hearings. Certainly,
when an unemployed or disabled worker is pitted against his
former employer, the latter usually has greater resources
with which to fight the case. The vigor of the employer's
opposition is checked, however, by the relatively low cost
of paying unemployment insurance contributions or workers'
compensation premiums. The employer may even want the
employee to collect, out of humanitarian considerations.
Where, however, the issue in the administrative
proceeding is going to determine a later civil action
arising from the same facts--for example, a personal injury
action arising from the operation of the employer's truck--
the employer will be prompted to oppose the benefit claim,
and to exert its weight to deny benefits to a relatively
helpless employee. g/
The amount of money involved in benefit cases is
also a factor to be considered by government officials
charged with apportioning limited resources. I think
everyone would agree that the amount of money the government
spends to conduct benefit hearings should not exceed the
amount the government pays in benefits. More judges cost
more money. It follows that administrative hearings must
be, in effect, summary proceedings. It is not a disparage-
ment of Administrative Law Judges to observe, as did one of
my colleagues in testimony before a legislative committee,
7/ N.Y. Labor Law § 538 (McKinney 1986).
8/ Letter from Richard T. Williams, Esq., to Honorable
Paul Wyler dated May 6, 1986, re CA Assembly Bill 3950
(unpublished). In a case decided after presentation of this
paper, a New York Court distinguished Ryan, infra, fn. 15,
and refused to apply collateral estoppel, on the grounds,
inter alia, that the party against whom the doctrine was
invoked had not initiated the administrative proceeding.
Dusovic v. N.J. Bus Operations, Inc., 508 N.Y.S. 2d 26 (App.
Div. 2nd Dep't., 1986).
that benefit cases provide parties with all of the due
process that can fit in 20 minutes. 2/
And so we have, both by necessity and design,
administrative hearings which are brief in duration, held on
short notice, and conducted in an informal manner, without
extensive preparation or costly representation. The benefit
to society of conducting hearings in this manner is demon-
strated by widespread public acceptance of administrative
hearings, and their endurance for half a century. However,
we must recognize that the price we pay for this system
consists of tolerating hearings which, when compared to
plenary trials conducted before court and jury, can only be
described as less than thorough.
Accordingly, I underscore my first point: because
administrative hearings are less searching than jury trials,
they should not determine the outcome of jury trials.
The tail should not wag the dog.
Let us turn to the effect of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
Initially, before the rule becomes known among lay
members of the public, the effect will be surprise, and
entrapment of the unwary. Parties will go into an adminis-
trative hearing intending to litigate the narrow issue
before the tribunal and will thereafter learn, to their
sorrow, that they have been precluded from presenting or
defending another, perhaps more substantial case, in another
forum.
9/ Barbaro Report, supra, fn. 6.
Is it fair, for example, that the decision of an
Unemployment Judge should determine:
A wrongful discharge case
A Title VII civil rights case
An OHSA complaint
A breach of contract action
An unfair labor practice charge
A negligence action
A union fair representation proceeding
An age discrimination case
or any other of a host of actions?
Even after the rule does become widely known,
however, there will be unrepresented parties to administra-
tive hearings who are unaware of its existence and will fall
prey to what they can only perceive as an unfair, hyper-
technical, legal trap. I_/
I submit that parties who participate in adminis-
trative hearings should not be required to anticipate the
possibility of future litigation, because such litigation is
very rare, and often cannot be foreseen in any event. Even
if it can be foreseen, the place to try a civil case is in
the civil courts. Parties should be free to use administra-
tive tribunals for the purpose of obtaining an administrative
determination, without the threat of other consequences
which are difficult or impossible to foresee.
When the rule of collateral estoppel is known to
the parties, and further litigation is anticipated, the
result is equally bad for the parties and the administrative
system. As I have already suggested, parties will be unable
to scale their administrative case to the size of the
administrative claim, even if they want to do so. The other
side will force them to expend resources appropriate to the
anticipated civil litigation.
Finally, where both sides do have the resources to
try the expected civil case before the administrative
__O/ See "Unemployment Insurance Hearings-A Trap For the
Unwary Employer". Littler Labor Report, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 1
(May 1986).
tribunal, the result is just as bad for the litigants and
the tribunal: either the parties will convert the adminis-
trative tribunal into a civil courtroom, or, what is worse,
a party will withdraw his administrative claim, rather than
jeopardizing his chances in the subsequent lawsuit.
This has happened to many of us. It might not
work because of the "opportunity to be heard" rule. 1l/
A civil trial can take days or weeks. If the
parties abuse the administrative process, the Administrative
Law Judge may be required to expend a great deal of time
which might be devoted to resolving administrative issues.
Moreover, the Administrative Law Judge does not
have the resources necessary to properly try civil cases.
The exclusionary rules, for example, have the effect of
limiting the scope of the evidence presented in civil cases.
Where the civil case is tried in an administrative forum, it
can actually take longer than it would in court, because the
parties are free to introduce hearsay, and other forms of
incompetent evidence.
It is, I submit, highly incongruous to allow
hearsay evidence, which is admissible in administrative
hearings, to control the outcome of civil trials, where such
evidence would not be admissible.
In addition, in some types of administrative
proceedings, particularly ratemaking and other forms of
business regulation, issues of policy may properly influence
the outcome of the proceedings. Such issues would have no
place before the civil court.
ll/ Compare Cavanagh, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of
California Unemployment Insurance Decisions in Subsequent
Civil Litigation. Los Angeles Lawyer, June 1986, p. 65.
12/ A bar association committee implies that ALJ s lack
judicial status and, accordingly, are not qualified to
render decisions having collateral estoppel effect. See
"Unemployment Insurance Decisions and the Doctrine of
Collateral Estoppel" 40 Record of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, 738 (December 1985). The
present author expressly repudiates this argument as
specious and self-defeating.
Different procedures apply in civil and adminis-
trative proceedings which have a direct bearing on the
outcome. Burdens of proof, and the rules of evidence, are
two obvious examples.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers requires that administrative questions be decided by
agencies, and that civil cases be tried in the courts. 13
The fundamental right to trial by jury is lost if
collateral estoppel is applied to administrative
tribunals. 14/
If we allow administrative hearings to be converted
into forums for litigating collateral matters, the entire
system of prompt, efficient and inexpensive administrative
adjudication will be seriously compromised.
I will now address the arguments most frequently
advanced in support of the application of collateral estoppel.
The first is the possibility that inconsistent
results will be reached in different proceedings. To this,
I have a simple answer--
So what?
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of my
worthy opponents on this issue.
I will not belabor the point. I will merely note
that, in law, the same word can have different meanings in
different contexts. It does not trouble me, for example,
that a person may be found to have committed misconduct for
purposes of license revocation, but not for the purpose of
imposing criminal sanctions. For one thing, different
12/ But see United States v. Utah Construction and Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), which can be read as holding
otherwise. The argument must be distinguished from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause issue decided in Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Co., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
II/ U.S. Const., Amd. VII. Note that Utah Construction &
Mining Co., supra, fn. 13, did not involve a claim triable
before a jury.
burdens of proof can result in different decisions in
criminal, civil and administrative cases.
It would not shock my conscience if an Administra-
tive Law Judge, deciding that a claimant had not stolen from
his employer, allowed Unemployment Insurance benefits, while
a civil jury found that the allegation of theft was not
defamatory, and rejected the employee's civil action. The
fact that an Administrative Law Judge may find that the
employee did steal, as in Ryan, L5/ is no reason, in my
view, to insist upon collateral estoppel. It is, I think,
sufficient to note that different tribunals have different
purposes and may, therefore, arrive at different results. 16/
The next argument is that of judicial economy. It
is said that collateral estoppel saves time for the parties
and the courts.
It is, of course, true that when a judge denies a
party his day in court, the court is spared the time of
trying the case. The time of the party who brought the
civil action is also saved, albeit unwillingly. I submit,
however, that this is neither fair nor appropriate. It is
less than due process--it is no process at all.
In addition, however, I suggest that application
of the doctrine will actually increase litigation. This is
because a court cannot apply collateral estoppel unless it
makes certain findings. The Ryan court recites the following
elements: 17/
L5/ Ryan v. N.Y. Telephone Company, 62 N.Y. 2d 494 (1984).
The Administrative Law Judge in Ryan was Hon. Margaret
Giovaniello, co-panelist for this presentation.
16/ In New York, by statute, collateral estoppel does not
attach to small claims adjudications or motor vehicle
hearings (UCCA § 1808; VTL § 155. McKinney 1986). There is
even a case which refused to apply the doctrine to a
criminal conviction Goldberg v. Barbieri; 53 N.Y. 2d 285
(1981).
17/ Quoted from Raff, supra, fn. 2.
1. Whether the issue is the same as that neces-
sarily decided in the first action.
2. Whether the issue was material to the first
action or proceedings and essential to the decision.
3. Whether the party against whom it is asserted
had a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision
now said to be controlling.
4. Whether the first action offered a full and
fair opportunity requires a consideration of the
realities of the litigation including the context and
other circumstances which may have had the practical
effect of discouraging or deterring a party from fully
litigating the determination such as:
a) nature of the forum;
b) importance of the claim in the prior
litigation;
c) incentive and initiative to litigate and
actual extent of the litigation;
d) the competence and expertise of counsel;
e) the availability of new evidence;
f) the differences in the applicable law; and
g) the foreseeability of future litigation.
In short, the very issue of whether to give
preclusive effect to the administrative determination will
have to be litigated in each and every case.
In sum, I believe that collateral estoppel is not
in the best interests of litigants, the public, the govern-
ment, the courts, or Administrative Law Judges. IS/ I
submit that the prestige and status of Administrative Law
Judges will be enhanced if their work is not hindered by the
1/ A decision by the California Supreme Court [People v.
Sims, 32 Cal. 3rd 468 (1982)], applying collateral estoppel
to a welfare adjudication, has been abrogated by statute.
inevitable delays, protracted hearings, or other factors
which will interfere with the performance of their duties.
The relatively efficient, single-purpose administrative
hearing system should be maintained in its present form.
Collateral estoppel should not be applied to administrative
hearings.
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